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INTRODUCTION: WHAT DISTINGUISHES CYBERMONEY FROM MONEY?
Economists long have admitted uncertainty about what money really
is. The Federal Reserve marks the confusion by monitoring at least
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four measures of money, M1,1 M2, 2 MS,8 and L.4  Even when de-
fined functionally, money's confines are uncertain. Money's useful-
ness as a vehicle for payment almost always is acknowledged, but it
often is counterposed against the role of money as a store of value,
with varying degrees of emphasis placed on each role.5 Meanwhile,
money also serves as a sort of loan from money-holders to money-
issuers.6 Moreover, in the background of most functional definitions
are suggestions that money serves as a tool for governments to
exercise macroeconomic control and to channel financial commerce
along preferred routes.7
Cybermoney is subject to the same definitional uncertainties as
money proper, plus a few of its own. Some use "cybermoney" or
"cybercash" to refer narrowly to anonymous small-scale payment
transactions over the Internet that are designed to facilitate Internet
purchases, especially purchases of information that are too small to
warrant the expense associated with clearing.' On the other hand,
at least one commentator uses the term "cybermoney" more generally
to refer to "any and all types of 'electronic money,"' including
"electronic funds transfers ... , electronic benefit transfers ....
electronic data processing . . . , electronic payment systems ....
1. MI includes currency, demand deposits, other checkable deposits, and traveler's checks.
See HARRY D. HUTCHINSON, MONEY, BANKING, AND THE U.S. ECONoMY 6 (7th ed. 1992).
2. M2 consists of M1 plus savings and small-denomination time deposits, overnight repos,
overnight Eurodollars, money market mutual funds, and money market deposit accounts. See
il. at 6-7.
3. M2 plus large-denomination time deposits at all depository institutions, repos at
commercial banks for terms longer than overnight, and institution-only money market mutual
fund balances comprise MS. See id. at 10.
4. L includes MS plus other liquid assets such as Eurodollars held by U.S. residents other
than banks, bankers' acceptances, commercial paper, Treasury bills, and other liquid Treasury
securities. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN E. GOODMAN, BARRON'S FINANCE & INVFSTMENT
HANDBOOK 347 (1987).
5. See, e.g., ROGER LEROY MILLER & ROBERT W. PULSINELLi, MODERN MONEY AND BANKING
33-48 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing various definitions of money supply).
6. The difference in value between the cost of a monetary token and the resources that
the token are worth in the market is termed "seigniorage." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1358
(6th ed. 1990). Traditionally, in metal-based systems, seigniorage was understood as the
difference between the base value of the metal and the face value of the coin. See JUDY
SHELTON, MONEY MELTDOWN-RESTORING ORDER TO THE GLOBAL CURRENCY SYSTEM 217-20
(1994). In flat paper systems in which there is no convertibility to metal, seigniorage is even
higher-the face value of the paper for the period during which the currency circulates, or,
stated differently, the implicit rate of interest on the face value of the paper. See id at 212-13.
7. See infra Part I.H (discussing reasons that government may want to manage money
supply to achieve macroeconomic control).
8. SeeKeiron Henderson, Cybemoney Friend orFoe?, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Mar. 11, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File (discussing how more traditional banking systems
are resisting cybermoney).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1075
global payment systems..., and use of home computer.., to access
bank services."
9
Because of the rapid, and inevitably uncertain, evolution in the
current practices and technologies of modem money and banking
this Article employs a broad analytical definition rather than more
particularized, empirically based understandings about the scope of
cybermoney that may be evolving in the business of banking.
Therefore, this Article presumes that money is any standardized, fungible
device that market participants recognize as representing a valid current claim
on resources in that market."l Additionally, unless otherwise noted, this
Article presumes that cybermoney is any such monetary device that
necessarily relies upon electronic signals to state the holder's claim.
Viewed in this broad way, cybermoney is a large and only subtly
discrete subcategory of money in general. Its only distinction from
money is, by definition, its necessary reliance on an electronic
medium. From this perspective, any discussion about whether to
regulate cybermoney should entail an inquiry into the basic rationales
for monetary regulation, to which this Article now turns.
I. WHY REGULATE MONEY?
Money is one of the oldest subjects of governmental regulation.
Not surprisingly, the justifications asserted by governments for their
interventions in this field are several and various. At least fifteen
sometimes overlapping rationales recur in discussions about the
government's role in regulating money."
A. To Set a Standard Accounting Unit
Perhaps the most elementary role asserted by governments for their
involvement in money is to define a common unit of monetary
measure that will enable the translation of values between different
classes of and markets for assets, where those classes and markets may
be segmented economically, geographically, or politically. Indeed, the
question of setting the unit of account was the first one addressed by
Alexander Hamilton in his 1791 Report on the Establishment of the
Mint.1
2
9. See Dan L. Nicewander, Electronic Banking-Smart Cards, Cyberspace and the Internet, 50
CONSUMER FIN. L.Q., Winter 1996, at 22.
10. Cf United States v. Gellman, 44 F. Supp. 360, 365 (D. Minn. 1942) (describing money
as "
[
a] ny material that by agreement serves as a common medium of exchange and measure of
value in trade").
11. See infra Part 1.
12. Hamilton pondered: "1st. What ought to be the nature of the money unit of the
United States?" 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2061 (1790-91).
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Shortly afterward, pursuant to its apparently substantial constitution-
al powers to regulate money, the U.S. federal government adopted a
formnal system for monetary notation that established the same
decimal-based dollar notation that is used today." The validity of
this regulatory endeavor to set a standard unit of monetary measure
never was questioned seriously 4 and is viewed widely as a proper
responsibility of any sovereign national government." Although it
is viewed as proper for governments to set a unit of account, it is not
universally understood to be necessary. A few countries, for example,
"borrow" units of account along with the currencies of better
established nations."6
B. To Fix Money's Relationship to Other Assets
The rate at which a particular form of money will be exchanged for
other valued assets is another elementary concern of government,
especially in the context of full-bodied or representative full-bodied
currencies17 and fixed-exchange-rate systems like the one that
prevailed among many nations from 1946 to 1971 pursuant to the
Bretton Woods Agreement.' 8 For example, beginning in 1792 in the
United States, Congress carefully fixed precise relationships among
gold, silver, and coin. 9 Likewise, in the Bretton Woods Agreement
Act,20 the United States in 1945 fixed the rates at which foreign
governments can redeem its currency for gold.2'
13. See The Mint Act 16, § 9, 1 Stat. 246, 248 (1792) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§ 5112 (1994)) (establishing Mint and regulating the Coins of the United States). Today, the
law still formally orders that "United States money" be "expressed" in dollars. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 5101.
14. See United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 567 (1857) (stating that
Constitution delegated to Congress responsibility to create uniform and pure standard of value).
15. See SHELTON, supra note 6, at 171-75.
16. Indeed, the United States itself began its monetary system on the template of the
Spanish milled dollar. As ofJune 1983, the currencies of at least 54 nations were pegged to a
single currency-36 of those currencies being pegged to the U.S. dollar. See ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 233 (2d ed. 1984) (citing INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 65-66 (1983)).
17. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 1, at 512-13 (describing how most of world's nations were
concerned with method by which exchange rates would be established and how system of
adjustable pegs emerged when exchange rates were kept stable in most cases).
18. See id at 512-15 (explaining how exchange rates were stabilized under Bretton Woods
System through national exchange stabilization funds).
19. Silver dollars were to contain 371 and four-sixteenth grains of pure silver or 416 grains
of standard silver. SeeThe Mint Act, ch. 16, § 9, 1 Stat. 246, 248 (1792). Meanwhile, ten-dollar
gold "Eagle" coins were to contain 247 and four-eighths grains of pure gold or 270 grains of
standard gold. See id.
20. 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1994).
21. See id.
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Although a benchmark relationship to an existing currency or asset
historically may have been useful for a fledgling currency, govern-
ments in the modem era have tended to withdraw from the task of
setting fixed relationships among more established currencies and
assets. Instead, governments in the modem era are allowing the
relative rates to be determined by the increasingly mature private
markets in currency. In the United States, at least since 1971 when
the dollar officially was allowed to "float," the international currency
markets, rather than governments, have set the relative value of the
dollar internationally-despite occasional calls for a return to a fixed
international gold standard.22 Domestically, the federal government
withdrew from the classical gold standard in 1914.23 In more recent
years, when governments like those in Russia and Nigeria tried to
enforce fixed international exchange rates for their currencies, black
markets in currency exchange sprung up quickly, undermining their
efforts.24 In short, the attempt to set a fixed exchange rate for a
currency is of questionable viability today, unless the issue is small and
the issuer is willing and able to subsidize discrepancies between the
exchange rate and the market price.
C. To Provide an Initial Source of Money
In the United States, the power of the federal government to coin
money was established constitutionally'5 and has been exercised ever
since.2" The issuance of money by the government may be justified
as a primer to start the engine of monetary circulation, giving
substantive content to money beyond its mere status as a unit of
account having a defined value relative to other currencies and assets.
A government's initial interest in issuing money to prime the pump
of circulation may be distinguished from its possibly separate interest
in controlling, or even monopolizing, the supply of money in
perpetuity, a goal discussed later.27 At least until the Civil War, the
U.S. government's power to issue money was not suggested to be
22. See SHELTON, supra note 6, at 218;Judy Shelton, End the Currency Poker Game, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 8, 1995, at A20.
23. See SHELTON, supra note 6, at 53.
24. See id. at 49-60.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cL. 5 ("The Congress shall have Power... To coin Money,
regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin ....").
26. In 1792, Congress passed an Act establishing a mint, and regulating coins of the United
States, which established the mint as a seat of government and among other things set the
standard for gold and silver coins in the United States. See. The Mint Act, ch. 16, 1 Stat. 246
(1792).
27. See infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
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exclusive." Although American states were prohibited constitution-
ally from coining money,2 9 probably because of their poor records
as issuers during pre-constitutional times, private parties could issue
currency and vigorously exploited this opportunity during the Gold
Rush era from 1830 to 1860." More importantly, private banks
issued paper money almost from the founding of the republic until
1863.3' Their issues were especially prolific during the free banking
era beginning in 1836, after the demise of the Second Bank of the
United States, and ending with the National Currency Act of 1863.2
Not until 1864 was the private issuance of coins outlawed,"3 and
private issue of paper currency apparently never has been prohibit-
ed. 4
In short, the issuance of money at the threshold of a monetary
system may be justified as a method of bringing life and currency to
the establishment of an otherwise abstract monetary system, but it is
a rationale that does not justify the monopolization of money.
D. To Facilitate the Ready Acceptance of Money
Having established a unit of account, adopted a benchmark of
relative value, and injected money into the stream of commerce,
governments also commonly have sought to ensure the public's ready
acceptance of that money. Fostering public acceptance is a job of
considerable difficulty and finesse for which law normally is not well
suited. Nonetheless, the usefulness of any form of money is linked
closely to the extent to which the public accepts it. Thus, govern-
ments often have applied themselves diligently to various forms of
public relations on all matters monetary.35
The first step that governments typically take to enhance money's
public acceptability is a simple and rather blunt technique: They
make money legal tender. In the United States, the legal tender rule
28. See SHELTON, supra note 6, at 236-41.
29. SeeU.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... coin Money, emit Bills of Credit;
make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts .. ").
30. See Lewis D. Solomon, Local Currency: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POLV'Y 59, 82 (1996) (discussing use and authorization of localized currency).
31. See id. at 62 (discussing how 1863 National BankingAct provided for federally chartered
note-issuing banks and also how Act taxed state chartered bank notes).
32. ch. 58, 12 Star. 665 (establishing Bureau of Currencywithin Department of the Treasury
to execute all national legislation regulating national currency secured by U.S. bonds).
33. SeeAct ofJune 8, 1864, 13 Stat. 120 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 486 (1994))
(setting forth penalty for counterfeiting U.S. coin).
34. See Solomon, supra note 30, at 82.
35. For example, central bankers routinely issue statements designed to influence currency
traders about the relative strength or weakness of their currencies-although there is increasing
skepticism about the efficacy of such jawboning.
1997] 1081
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVEW [Vol. 46:1075
adopted in the first mint act3 6 remains in today's law books 7 and
is recited on every Federal Reserve note.
One might imagine that the legal tender rule would end any
question about the acceptability of a form of money, but public
reluctance still may hamper the viability of legal tender as a circulat-
ing medium. A reluctant public, for instance, may drag its feet in
accepting a particular form of money, may flaunt the legal tender rule
outright, or may avoid denominating debts in terms of the unit of
account. Effective public resistance to a particular form of currency
is common today in many less developed countries where the public
disfavors the native currency and has access to a more desirable
foreign currency, such as dollars, marks, pounds, or yen.
Another type of public resistance to accepting a form of money
arises when the supply of that money is infected with undesirable
elements, including debased forms of money, counterfeit versions, or
inferior substitutes. Even when the incidence of such "bad" money
is relatively small, transactions still may be slowed as handlers check
for quality. If the incidence of bad money is large enough, the bad
money will drive the "good" money out of circulation completely.'
Governments may address this sort of public resistance to dealing
in money of inconsistent quality by legally discouraging debasement,
counterfeiting, and lesser-valued substitutes. In the United States, for
example, the power to debase the money supply is segregated partly
in the Federal Reserve to protect against easy monetary intervention
by politicians seeking short-term gains. Another way to preserve the
quality of the money supply is to adopt and enforce anticounterfeiting
laws.39 Thus, to protect against the introduction of potentially
inferior substitutes, the U.S. government takes pains to ensure that its
coins differ from Canadian coins of comparable size and denomina-
tion.
In short, government occasionally plays a role in cultivating the
public's willingness to accept money in transactions, whether through
direct regulation of the public's behavior or by ensuring that the
36. "[A]II the gold and silver coins which shall have been struck at, and issued from the said
mint, shall be a lawful tender in all payments whatsoever...." The Mint Act, ch. 16, § 16, 1
Stat. 246, 250 (1792).
37. See 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (1994) ("United States coins and currency ... are legal tender for
all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.").
38. This concept is known as Gresham's Law and is attributed widely to Sir Thomas
Gresham (1519-1579), financial advisor to Queen Elizabeth 1. See MILLER & PULSiNELLI, supra
note 5, at 27, 221.
39. The counterfeit laws of the United States are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 470-513 (1994).
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quality of the money supply is so good and consistent as to encourage
the public to rely on it without worry.
E. To Prevent Panic in Redemption, Convertibility, or Transfer
Even if the public initially accepts and uses a form of money, it later
may lose faith in that form. For example, although one may hold
deposits in a particular bank when the bank appears healthy, one may
seek to withdraw those deposits if the bank develops an apparent
weakness. Should the weakness appear suddenly, and should public
perceptions gel simultaneously, the results can be a widespread,
panicked attempt to flee from the asset and a loss in the viability of
the form of money. This phenomenon is exemplified by the repeated
financial panics of the late nineteenth century, such as the panic of
1857, which occurred in the wake of the sinking of the CentralAmerica
on its way to New York from California with $2 million in gold.4"
One response to the threat of financial panic is to provide coping
devices. Although private arrangements, like the "loan certificates"
developed by the banking clearinghouses during the late nineteenth
century, can minimize the effects of financial panics without govern-
mental intervention, governments sometimes have used a financial
panic tojustify monetary and financial intervention. For example, the
financial panic of 1907 led directly to the passage of the Aldrich-
Vreeland Act,41 which nationalized the contemporary technology for
providing liquidity during a financial panic. Reserve requirements,
which now are set between eight and fourteen percent of transaction
accounts held by banks,42 also serve, in part, as a legally enforceable
method of coping with the threat of a bank run.43
In addition to providing cover in the midst of a financial panic,
government might intervene to reduce public incentives to flee from
40. For a discussion of the panics and private attempts to quell them, see 2 FRITz REDLICH,
THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING (1968); and David G. Oedel, PrivateInterbankDiscpline, 16
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 827, 350-60 (1993).
41. ch. 229, 35 Stat. 546 (1908) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 104, but repealed by Act of Sept.
23, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 602(e) (7), 108 Stat. 2292, 2294).
42. See 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (2) (A) (ii) (1994) (setting forth range of Federal Reserve Board's
("FRB.) discretion to set reserve rates).
43. Recent Swiss experience suggests that mandatory reserve levels may be higher than
necessary to cope with the threat of a run. When the Swiss dispensed with mandatory reserve
requirements in 1988, reserves fell dramatically, apparently without notable effect on the stability
of the currency or depository banks. See F.X. Browne & David Cronin, Payments Technologies,
Financial Innovation, and Laissez-Faire Banking, 15 CATOJ. 101, 110-11 (1995). Excess reserve
requirements may serve purposes other than to cope with panic, such as to tax financial
institutions, to fund the regulatory bureaucracy, and to operate as one of several tools for
governmental manipulation of the money supply. SeeMILLER & PULSINELU, supra note 5, at 271-
75 (discussing reasons for requiring maintenance of resources).
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a monetary instrument. To the extent that such an intervention is
successful and a panic does not occur, maintenance of an effective
system for withstanding panics would be unnecessary.
Deposit insurance is a good example of a governmental interven-
tion justified for its usefulness in minimizing the possibility of panic.
Thus, although the banking crisis and "holiday" of 1933 provided the
impetus for the initial adoption of federal deposit insurance,4 4 the
continued provision of deposit insurance by the U.S. government
today represents a fundamentally different strategy for addressing the
threat of financial panic than does the intervention of government to
provide liquidity during a crisis. Deposit insurance minimizes the
possibility of panic; legally assisted liquidity salves a panic. However,
both strategies share the common general purpose of minimizing
disruption and loss from possible changes in public perceptions of the
vitality of particular monetary instruments or institutions.
F To Guard Against the Possible Misuse and Counterfeiting of Money
In its traditional forms, money gives to its users the chance to buy
or sell valuables more quickly and more anonymously than in a barter
economy. This feature may be useful not only to legitimate
businesspersons seeking to streamline commerce, but also to parties
hoping to hide illegal transactions, illicit sources of funding, and
taxable income from public scrutiny. To prevent the use of money
for such fraudulent purposes, governments sometimes oblige financial
institutions to report unusual cash transactions and to disclose
monetary flows that appear to be linked to fraudulent activities.45
The government's interest in policing against the misuse of currency
is counterposed, however, against its obligation to avoid excessive
intrusion into its citizens' reasonable expectations of privacy--a duty
that is enshrined formally in law.46
44. Federal deposit insurance was ushered in by the Glass-Steagall Act, also known as The
BankingAct of 1933. SeeThe Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 12B, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1994)) (providing for "safer and more effective use of the assets
of banks to regulate interbank control").
45. In the United States, for example, banks generally are obliged to report currency
transactions greater than an amount prescribed by regulation of the Secretary of the Treasury.
SeeThe Bank SecrecyAct, 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994). Currently, the triggering amount is $10,000.
See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1996). The statute provides for mandatory exemptions to the reporting
requirement when the transaction involves another depository institution; state, federal, or local
government agencies; entities organized under state, local, or federal law to exercise
governmental authority; or any business that the Secretary of the Treasury determines is not of
interest to law enforcement. See31 U.S.C. § 5313(d). The filing of required reports is governed
by 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.20-103.29.
46. See, e.g., The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422. Section
3402 limits the ability of government authorities to access financial information in certain
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Governments also sometimes defend their issue and regulation of
money on the ground that such intervention minimizes the threat of
counterfeiting. The standardization of the supply of monetary issues
may call greater attention to irregularities in issue, thereby simulta-
neously increasing the chance of detecting counterfeits and reducing
the incentive to issue counterfeits.
G. To Limit Over-Supplies of Money and Erosion in the Value of
Prior Issues
The successful implementation and circulation of any monetary
device poses a lingering temptation for any individual, firm, or
government with continuing supervisory authority to increase the
supply of the money. By effecting implementation, the issuer gains
funds for its discretionary use, the costs of which ultimately are borne
by all prior holders of the currency to the extent that the over-issue
debases the value of the currency as a whole.
Over-issue of currency has been a problem throughout monetary
history. During the pendency of the Articles of Confederation in the
United States, the Continental Congress' issuance of paper money was
so rapid that the value of the paper quickly became negligible, thus
giving rise to the idiom of deprecation, "Not worth a Continental."47
The infamous inflation of Weimar Germany after World War 148 and
the notorious inflations of some South American countries in the
1980s,49 offer more recent examples.
To limit over-issues of currency, law takes two basic approaches: (1)
it limits the number of potential issuers; and (2) it restricts the
circumstances under which the remaining issuers may increase
supplies of money.
Examples of legal limits on the ranks of issuers include the U.S.
Constitution's prohibition against states issuing money,5" the nation-
situations, such as when the customer has authorized disclosure or when a subpoena or warrant
has been procured. See id. § 3402. See generally William C. Heffernan, Property, Privacy and the
Fourth Amendment 60 BROOK. L. REv. 633, 670-88 (1994) (discussing implications of Fourth
Amendment on government's ability to seize intangible and computerized bank assets).
47. See Oedel, supra note 40, at 337 & n.34 (stating that, as a symbolic gesture, government
redeemed Continentals in 1790 at one percent of their face value).
48. From 1920 to 1924, the German economy existed in a state of hyperinflation, with a rate
of 100 million percent between December 1922 and November 1923. See MILLER & PULSnIELI,
supra note 5, at 19.
49. Brazil's inflation rate at times exceeded 100% per month. See Norman Gall, Shunning
Map to Prosperity, Vast Nations Take the Low Road, WALL ST.J., May 31, 1989, at A18.
50. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, ci. 1.
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alization of paper money issue in 1863,51 and the subsequent consoli-
dation of much authority to issue paper money in the Federal Reserve
banks.52 Regulation also limits the flexibility of the few remaining
issuers of money. For example, the Federal Reserve Bank ("FRB") is
constrained in its manipulation of the money supply by its obligation
to make most important monetary supply decisions through the
vehicle of the Federal Open Market Committee, 3 a body that is
subject to various procedural checks designed to minimize the
possibility of rash, ill-considered, and overly political decisions about
the supply of money.
H. To Use Money as a Tool to Sustain Macroeconomic Health
If a particular absolute amount of money is shown to have been
associated with an acceptably robust level of macroeconomic activity,
a government might be inclined to try to fix the money supply at that
"ideal" level. For several reasons, though, economies do not stand
still. The population grows or shrinks; business grows or shrinks; the
unemployment rate grows or shrinks; domestic spending grows or
shrinks; the foreign demand for currency, goods, and services grows
or shrinks. Fluctuations in the markets for money make it possible to
justify governmental attempts to manage those markets to sustain
steady economic conditions.
During the twentieth century, governments have grown increasingly
sensitive to their roles in sustaining a macroeconomically healthy
balance between the supply of and the demand for money, while
encouraging steady, gradual growth in the supply of money to avoid
constricting the natural growth of the economy. When governments
intervene for these purposes, they have two basic strategies: they
attempt to influence either the demand for or the supply of money.
51. See National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Star. 665 (providing for a national
currency secured by U.S. stock). See generally BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTYAND AN EMPTY PURSE
321-32 (1970) (discussing historical context and debate leading to passage of National Currency
Act, which established national currency).
52. See The Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.). The Federal Reserve Act was passed to establish a centralized system of banks to
"furnish an elastic currency" as well as for other purposes. See id. The legislation governing
Federal reserve notes is found at 12 U.S.C. §§ 411-422 (1994).
53. The Federal Open Market Committee comprises the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and five representatives of the Federal Reserve banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 263.
Pursuant to § 263(b), no bank of the Federal Reserve shall "engage or decline to engage in
open-market operations" under 12 U.S.C. § 348(a), or §§ 353-359. See id. § 263(b). Those
sections pertain to such activities as the purchase and sale of cable transfers, see id. § 353,
dealings in gold coin and bullion, see id. § 354, the purchase and sale of government obligations,
see id § 335, the purchase of commercial paper, see id. § 356, and the establishment of discount
rates, see id. § 357.
1086
WHY REGULATE CYBERMONE108?
Both strategies have been used, although the first, and most adven-
turesome, regulatory efforts in this century focused on manipulating
monetary demand, and later regulatory efforts have focused on
manipulating supplies of money.
Before and during the Great Depression, the FRB and other central
banks resisted providing enough liquidity (supplying enough money)
to assist banks and firms facing financial panic.54 Under specie-
backed monetary systems, like the one that existed in the United
States until 1914, governments had limited ability to manipulate the
money supply.55 Even after 1914 in the United States, the FRB was
wary of experimenting with the potentially powerful and untested
effects of money supply manipulations.56
Meanwhile, encouraged by the insights of economistJohn Maynard
Keynes,57 other arms of governments adopted aggressive governmen-
tal spending policies to boost demand for money.8 Demand for
money also may be influenced at the central bank level by lowering
or raising interest rates, which in turn may be affected by adjusting
the price and quantity of funds available for banks to borrow through
operation of the "discount window."
Supplies of money, on the other hand, are manipulated most
directly today in the United States through the availability of
government debt for sale and the open market purchase or sale of
such debt by the FRB. Purchases of government debt introduce new
money into the economy with high-powered, multiplier effects.
Alternatively, sales of such debt retire money from circulation, thereby
ending the cycle in which such funds naturally multiply.
As the twentieth century draws to a close, however, the ability of
central bankers to dictate either the demand for or the supply of
money is growing weaker, apparently because the relative size and
frequency of governmental intervention in the money markets is
decreasing in relationship to the amount of private activity.59 Thus,
54. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 1867-1960, at 300 (1963).
55. See id. at 212-13.
56. See id. at 213-14, 532-33.
57. See generalyJOHN MAYNARD KEYNS, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST,
AND MONEY (1936). Keynes was initially a monetarist, but developed a theory of macroeconomic
vitality that included a role for the government as a fiscal force in determinig the aggregate level
of demand.
58. In the United States, for instance, the Roosevelt Administration established the Works
Progress Administration to employ hundreds of thousands of people in public projects.
59. See Kenneth H. Bacon, The End of Banking as We Know It, WALL ST..J.,July 9, 1993, at
Al (discussing FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan's alarm about FRB's growing difficulty in
attempting to exercise control over money supply).
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although the macroeconomic watchdog rationale for governmental
intervention in the regulation of money historically has seemed to
justify almost any plausible degree of governmental intervention in
the money business-including monopolization of the supply of
money-the rationale is growing progressively more dubious.
I. To Streamline and Police Monetary Transactions
Even after facilitating the basic development of currency, govern-
ment may have an additional role in facilitating the operation of a
predictable, uniform, fair, and inexpensive system for its exchange.
Although, as an historical matter, most payment systems have
emerged from commercial practice, state and federal laws often have
been enacted to regularize those procedures and to reform aspects of
those systems that tended to take advantage of relatively disorganized
groups of affected users. Examples of such regulations include
Articles 3, 4, and 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."),60
the Expedited Funds Availability Act,6" and the Electronic Fund
Transfers Act ("EETA"). 62  EFTA and its implementing regulation,
Regulation E,63 occasionally are cited as templates for the possible
regulation of cybermoney transactions. 4
60. See U.C.C. arts. 3, 4, & 4A (1991). These articles of the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C.") are illustrative of legislative attempts to structure the rules governing a form of
currency after private markets have established workingpmctices independently. The comments
to each article speak directly of a need for legislation to define clearly the rights and duties of
private parties and to provide fair notice to persons engaging in various transactions. Article 3
of the U.C.C. deals with negotiable instruments, attempting to standardize the conventions
attending their use and to put persons using them on notice of the rights and duties recognized
by law. SeeJAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-1, at 460
(4th ed. 1995). When first created, Article 3 significantly changed existing law. See U.C.C. § 3-
301 cmt.
Article 4 defines the rights between parties with respect to bank deposits and collections. The
official comment to § 4-401 states the need for comprehensive legislation: "There is needed a
uniform statement of the principal rules of the bank collection process with ample provision for
flexibility to meet the needs of the large volume handled and the changing needs and
conditions that are bound to come with the years .... " U.C.C. § 4-401 cmt.
Article 4A, added in 1989, applies to funds transfers, specifically to "wholesale wire transfers."
See U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (1991). It does not apply to transactions governed by the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act ("EFTA"). The drafters of Article 4A believed that uniform
legislation was necessary as there was an absence of comprehensive law "defin [ing] the rights
and obligations that arise from wire transfers." Id. They also lamented that there was "no
consensus about the juridical nature of a wire transfer and consequently of the rights and
obligations created." Id.
61. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1994). Implementing regulations are found at 12 C.F.R. pt.
210 (1996) ("Regulation J").
62. See Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XX, 92 Stat. 3728 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-
1693r).
63. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205.
64. See Melanie L. Fein, Regulating Cyberspace: What Does It Mean to Banking? in THE NEW
BUSINESS OF BANKING: WHAT BANKS CAN Do Now, at 91, 95 (PLI Corp. Law & Prac. Course
Handbook Series No. 912, 1995) (indicating that, although EFTA and its regulations impose
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J. To Supervise Lending and Borrowing
Probably the most ancient rationale for governmental intervention
in finance involves the delicate, potentially exploitive, nature of
relations between lenders and borrowers.' Money itself, however,
technically is a loan from holder to issuer. Because the issuers of
money typically are stronger than the users of money (who formally
are the "lenders" of present values), government need not intervene
to protect the "borrower" issuers.
Nevertheless, money markets can have an effect on traditional
lending relationships. If government is so involved in monetary
regulation as to have a hand in purposefully guiding macroeconomic
supply of and demand for money, then government also may have a
responsibility to ensure that its manipulations do not discriminate
incidentally against particular classes of potential borrowers in the
lending markets. This has been a longstanding subject of governmen-
tal concern when monitoring bank lending, as evidenced, for
example, by diverse state consumer protection laws, usury prohibi-
tions, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,66 and the Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977.67 On the other hand, the regulatory
bureaucracies themselves have faced less legal scrutiny of their
operations; however, at least one, the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation, was dealt a legislative death blow in the wake
of the notorious bailout of the thrift industry in the 1980s.1a
K To Foster Competition and to Inhibit Private Monopolization
Even if the banking industry were not consolidating at a rapid pace
already, the American people and their political representatives likely
would entertain the application of antitrust laws and affiliation
limitations with respect to any monetary systems that might promise
requirements that are not feasible in certain electronic funds transactions and that may create
security risks, they apply to non-banks, whereas other federal banking laws protecting consumers
do not).
65. See David G. Oedel, Pu.ling Banking Law: Its Effects and Purposes, 67 U. COLO. L. REv.
477, 530-36 (1996) (discussing practices and regulations promoting borrower protections).
66. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601,
1691-1691f (1994)) (amending Title VII of the Consumer Credit Protection Act to prohibit
discrimination in credit transactions).
67. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1994) (encouraging financial institutions to meet credit needs
of low and moderate income households in local community).
68. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (eliminating Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation).
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to dominate payment transactions in the future. Indeed, the
American public long has been skeptical of concentrations of power
in money and finance. For example, each of the first quasi-public
controllers of the currency, the Bank of North America, the First
Bank of United States, and the Second Bank of the United States, was
dissolved in the wake of general public alarm at their sheer size and
efficacy in the business of administering monetary discipline. 9 The
Sherman Act,7" the Glass-Steagall Act?' and the Bank Holding
Company Act72 remain living legal reminders of public suspicions
about financial concentration. Indeed, the application of antitrust law
to cybermoney already has been suggested.73
L. To Protect Against Overcompetition in a New Natural Monopoly
The FRB occasionally has chosen to nationalize new payment
technologies, apparently on the assumption that private entities would
not be able to amass sufficient resources to develop such technologies
on their own. For instance, soon after its creation in 1913, the FRB
attempted to nationalize check clearing facilities and began a
subsidized monopoly in the business of wire transfers.74 Despite
some evidence that the private sector already was providing, or was
capable of developing, technologies in these fields, the potential for
FRB intervention in new payment technologies plainly is precedented.
M. To Tax Citizens and to Fund Government Operations
One classic justification for governmental provision of money is, in
effect if not in name, to tax the public and to fund governmental
operations without resorting to normal legislative processes. During
the pendency of the Articles of Confederation, for example, the
Continental Congress lacked formal taxing authority and thus for lack
of any other meaningful funding alternative, was obliged to issue
69. SeeJAMEs WILLARD HURST, A LEGAL HISTORY OF MONEY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1774-
1970, at 7, 77-78 (1973) (explaining creation and later demise of the Bank of North America,
the First Bank of United States, and the Second Bank of the United States due in good measure
to "local agrarian jealousy"); see also HAMMOND, supra note 51, at 18-25 (describing creation of
independent Treasury by Congress in 1840, later repealed in 1841 and enacted again in 1846,
with goal of extricating federal government from banking business and leaving banking to
individual states).
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
71. 12 U.S.C. §§ 347a, 3476, 412.
72. ld. §§ 1841-1850.
73. See Elinor H. Solomon, Future Money and Banks: 1990-2010, 37 ANTITRUST BuLL. 799,
830-32 (1992).
74. See Oedel, supra note 40, at 356-60, 369-74 (describing federal government's entry into
check clearing business, activity previously performed by private banks, and into wire transfer
service).
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money.75 Again during the Civil War, the issuance of treasury notes
was used to fund a majority of governmental expenses. 76 In general,
especially when faced with politically dangerous crises, many nations
throughout history have chosen to impose indirect taxes through the
issue of money, rather than following traditional political routes that
might not yield the necessary license.
77
N. To Subsidize Particular Groups or Activities
According to James Willard Hurst, governmental subsidization of
groups or activities historically has been a disfavored rationale for
financial regulation. "Some men desired, others feared, regulations
of money which might bring large shifts in the distribution of wealth
or income, to alter the structure of power among interests or classes.
On balance the record [rejected] legal regulation for th[is]
goal[]."" Nevertheless, the effects of monetary policy on wealth
have continued to be subjects of debate. For instance, during the
period of high interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
burdens of these high rates on different socioeconomic groups were
noted with concern.79 Wage earners were believed by some to
benefit at the relative expense of persons on fixed incomes and
holders of non-income-producing assets."' Moreover, in banking
regulation, the federal government occasionally has protected special
groups from market forces, as it did by passing the National Housing
Act of 19341 and the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.82 The
United States also has directed funds extraterritorially, for instance,
during the Marshall Plan, to recovering European economies during
the late 1940s and early 1950s,13 and more recently, through the
funding of international financial institutions. 4
75. See HupsT, supra note 69, at 5 (noting that Congress had no power to levy taxes before
or under Articles of Confederation, so money in form of bills of credit was issued).
76. See HAMMOND, supra note 51, at 42-43, 264 (explaining that tax collections were
insufficient to cover war expense and that war was "bought on borrowed money").
77. For instance, during the U.S. Revolutionary War, the rickety alliance reflected in the
Continental Congress could not agree to tax the people directly but did manage to issue a
currency, thereby taxing the people indirectly.
78. HuRsT, supra note 69, at 74.
79. Cf Sources of Inflation: Three Inflation Episodes in Industrial Countries, WORLD ECON.
OUTLOOK, Oct. 1, 1996, at 100.
80. Cf Patrick Lee, Almost Since Pandora's Era, Inflation Has Been Hard to Contain, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1996, at 6.
81. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1749bbb-21 (1994) (facilitating home ownership).
82. Id §§ 2901-2907 (encouraging lending to disfavored neighborhoods and persons).
83. The Marshall Plan Cost the United States almost $80 billion in 1990 dollars. SeeMichael
Kinsley, We Gave at the Office, TIME, Feb. 19, 1990, at 98.
84. Congress most recently appropriated funds for international organizations like the
World Bank and regional development banks in the Foreign Operations, Expert Financing, and
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0. To Protect Existing Regulatory Arrangements and
Overall Financial Soundness
A final rationale for the regulation of money arises from the fact
that so much of money, banking, and finance already is regulated
thoroughly. In accord with the theory of the "second best,"' it
sometimes is argued that regulation of a new subject, even if
unwarranted as an abstract matter still may be warranted in the real
"second best" world because related subjects are not themselves free
from regulation.8" By regulating the new entrant to the field (so the
argument goes), one may avoid disrupting a greater regulatory
scheme that may be justified on other grounds.8 For example, in
banking and finance, regulation is justified to protect the safety and
soundness of the financial system as a whole. In other words, the
mere presumption and pervasiveness of regulation in money, banking,
and finance in the minds of some lawmakers may serve to justify
regulation of new innovations in the field.
More particularly, any threat of a redemption problem within any
unit of account used in the payment system poses the potential for a
domino effect of failures in the clearing of payments down the line.
To the extent that any form of money is subject to redemptive risk,
is of a sizable volume, and is issued in the payment system generally,
the government may be justified additionally in regulating it to
preserve systemic safety and soundness.
II. Do THE CLASSIC REASONS FOR MONETARY REGULATION JUSTIFY
REGULATION OF CYBERMONEY?
A. To Set a Standard Cybermoney Accounting Unit?
Because cybermoney appears to be emerging as an adjunct to
established monetary accounting systems and is being denominated
in standard monetary units, it is plausible that there will be no
occasion for governmental intervention on the pretext of establishing
a new unit of accounting. On the other hand, it is conceivable that
some firms may wish to sever some forms of cybermoney from
denomination in standard units of currency-especially forms of
Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-107, 110 Stat. 704, 719-22 (1996)
(appropriating funds for humanitarian assistance in foreign countries).
85. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 16-17 (1982).
86. See id. at 15-35.
87. See id. at 16.
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cybermoney used in information exchange that might be stated in
"cyberbytes" or some other novel and distinct term, rather than in
dollars, cents, and mills. Indeed, the adoption of a new unit of
account might obviate many questions of taxation, regulation, and
choice of law that otherwise might arise in the business of cybermoney
transactions. Even if such a distinction develops, however, there is
little reason to believe that commercial entities through a trade
association or self-regulatory organization cannot agree on a common
unit of account if they choose, as airlines managed to do in establish-
ing "frequent flyer miles."'t
B. To Fix Cybermoney's Relationship to Other Assets?
Given the sophistication of most modem financial and money
markets, it would appear unnecessary and unwise to revert to the
formal regulatory fixation of a relationship between cybermoney and
any other established forms of money, even if cybermoney is
denominated in its own unit of account. On those few recent
occasions when governments have attempted to peg the value of a
particular currency to another asset, extraterritorial currency traders
and domestic black markets have overwhelmed such efforts. 9
In the United States, furthermore, the presumption against
government monopolization of issue in the early development of a
new payment vehicle is fixed even more firmly. As Federal Reserve
Bank of New York President William McDonough recently stated,
before the FRB would issue cybermoney itself, a "clear indication that
private-sector supplies alone cannot provide this service with the same
effectiveness, scope and equity as the Federal Reserve" would have to
be shown.9" Such a showing in the cybermoney market, where
several private firms presently are vying for position has not yet been
made.
On the other hand, to the extent that a form of cybermoney is
denominated formally in another currency and is convertible by
contract to that currency, it may be appropriate to make a legal
requirement that any institution contractually liable for redeeming or
88. SeeJohn Greenwald, TheFee of Free Fying, TIME, May 9, 1994, at 62 (discussing overhaul
of frequent flyer programs).
89. In the latter stages of the Soviet Union, for instance, the fixed official exchange rate
for the ruble was overridden by the black market, resulting in a general monetary crisis. See
generally Editorial, The Empire Melts, WALL ST.J., Dec. 3, 1991, at A14 (noting that after collapse
of Soviet Union, government officials moved to allow ruble to float "rather than trying to
maintain the fiction of a fixed exchange rate").
90. Federal Reserve Will Let Private Firms Push Cyberspace Frontier, McDonough Says, 67 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 623, 624 (Oct. 14, 1996).
1997] 1093
THE AMERICAN UNEPRSVTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1075
converting the currency be licensed and supervised for soundness, or,
in the alternative, that such an entity establish a legally separate fund
or purchase private deposit insurance to cover the contingent liability.
C. To Provide an Initial Source of Cybennoney?
Given the fact that several entities.already are beginning-to issue
forms of cybermoney,1 it appears doubtful that governments initially
will be obliged to issue cybermoney themselves. Even if the
Bundesbank is correct in its recent speculation that central banks
eventually may find themselves in the role of cybermoney issuers in
order to maintain control of the money supply if cybermoney proves
popular,92 it is extremely doubtful that such a role is warranted at
this preliminary period.
D. To Facilitate the Ready Acceptance of Cybermoney?
The question of whether a particular form of cybermoney denomi-
nated in an established currency will fall within the rubric of the legal
tender rule eventually may be tested legally. Even if a form of
cybermoney is held not to be legal tender, however, the ease with
which cybermoney may facilitate transactions still could make the
matter moot. After all, checks are not legal tender, yet they have
managed to capture a huge share of the payment transactions
business.
To the extent that any concerns about the reliability of cybermoney
are not solved by effective proprietary encryption systems,94 legisla-
tion narrowly tailored to protecting the reliability of cybermoney from
counterfeiting might be worthwhile. On the other hand, it is possible
that such legislation would prove superfluous, as existing criminal
laws, anti-fraud laws, and anti-counterfeiting laws might be stretched
to reach cybermoney.
91. SeeJennifer Kingson Bloom, A Glimpse into the Future of Money, as Citi Sees I4 AM. BANKER,
Feb. 23, 1996, at 12 (noting that Digicash and Cybercash are providing electronic currency for
cyberspace); Germany: Central Banks May Issue Cybermoney, ELEGTRONIC PAYMENTS INT'L, June 1,
1996, available in Wesdaw, 1996 WL 9799490 [hereinafter Germany (noting that at least one
Internet e-cash payment system is operating now with others underway).
92. See Germany, supra note 91.
93. See Fred R. Bleahley, Fast Money: Electronic Payments Now Supplant Checks at More Large
Firms, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 1994, at Al (explaining that number of electronic payment
transactions for corporations is less than 1% of 12 billion checks drafted annually). The cost
of printing, mailing, and clearing the almost 60 billion checks written in the United States
annually is estimated to cost more than $580 billion. See id.
94. See generally Henderson, supra note 8 (indicating that difficulties of deciphering
encryption codes protecting cybermoney and relatively small size of anticipated cybermoney
transactions may deter cybermoney scams).
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E. To Prevent Panic in Redemption, Convertibility, or Transfer?
If cybermoney is defined broadly to include the many existing
forms of monetary transactions that rely upon electronic media, then
there is little reason to fear panic in redemption, convertibility, or
transfer. Electronic-based payments already swamp paper-based
transactions in transactional value,95 and do so with less risk of panic
than in the pre-wire-transfer era (before 1920), when financial panics
were relatively commonplace.
96
On the other hand, if cybermoney is defined narrowly to include
the systems of money now being developed primarily as ways to
facilitate Internet payment, then new issues may be at stake. Given
the minuscule significance of the cybermoney market at this time, the
initial commercial plans to apply cybermoney primarily in low-value
transactions, and the relative sophistication of likely users of
cybermoney, it seems premature either to develop elaborate public
mechanisms to cope with potential liquidity problems or to provide
some sort of a public insurance mechanism to avoid the possibility of
panic.
To the extent that concerns about the liquidity of issuers eventually
are deemed to be serious, however, regulatory options are plausible.
As noted previously, one might subject issuers to regulatory supervi-
sion, require them to post a fund to cover their contingent liabilities,
or oblige them to prove that they have privately insured all
cybermoney accounts against the possibility of issuer failure or mistake
in transmission.97 If such steps were deemed useful, it at least is
conceivable that they could be imposed by self-regulatory organization
rather than government.
F To Guard Against the Possible Misuse and Counterfeiting
of Cybermoney?
To the extent that cybermoney is defined broadly to include all
monetary systems relying on electronic media, the misuse of
cybermoney already is being addressed legally, and apparently with
relative satisfaction to tax collectors and law enforcement authorities.
On the other hand, if cybermoney is defined more narrowly to mean
Internet payment arrangements, a new subject of regulation may be
95. The FRB reports that in the United States during 1991, $417 trillion in electronic
payments were made, as opposed to $70 trillion in paper and check payments and $1.7 trillion
in currency and coin payments. See Solomon, supra note 73, at 803.
96. See generally 2 REDLICH, supra note 40.
97. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
10951997]
THE AMERICAN UNIWERSIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1075
arising. If so, it seems premature at this early juncture to leap into
regulatory systems to guard against the misuse of a medium that is not
yet effectively in use. Eventually, if necessary, legislation along the
lines of the Bank Secrecy Act98 as tempered by the Financial Privacy
Act9 could be enacted to protect the privacy of the vast majority of
cybermoney users and to permit the monitoring of a few transactions
that are suspicious on their face or that are being conducted by
persons suspected for independent reasons of criminal activity.
Other unlawful acts like counterfeiting, invasion of privacy, and
cyber-theft pose immediate real risks to all parties involved in
cybermoney transactions. Despite such commonly feared threats,
however, the dangers do notjustify governmental intervention for two
reasons. First, the private suppliers of cybermoney services already
have a powerful self interest to develop encryption systems and
settlement protocols that will reduce the risks of fraud to negligible
levels. Second, even if it wanted to intervene, the government largely
lacks the expertise necessary to develop and maintain the kinds of
sophisticated technologies that would serve as effective deterrents.
This function is better left to those parties in the best positions and
with the greatest incentives to minimize the risks of loss-the service
providers.
G. To Limit Over-Supplies of Cybermoney?
If private institutions are permitted to issue cybermoney without
restraint, it is conceivable under some scenarios that they could be
tempted to provide more cybermoney than either they could support
or the market could use; debasement, panic, and institutional failure
all are possible results. On the other hand, it also is conceivable that
cybermoney could be fixed directly to another monetary asset, could
be impossible to re-circulate, and could be redeemed quickly, so that
there is little practical risk of over-issue.
In short, in seeking implicit regulatory endorsement of any
particular version of cybermoney, it would be important for any issuer
to anticipate questions along these lines, and to explain publicly how
its system would work and why it would pose no threat of over-issue.
To the extent that a risk of over-issue still is evident, it would be
possible to require that issuers of cybermoney establish an indepen-
dent fund covering the value of all outstanding cybercurrency,
purchase private deposit insurance to cover any remaining contingent
98. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959 (1994).
99. Id. §§ 3401-3422.
1096
WHY REGULATE CYBERMONEY?
liabilities, or submit to reserve requirements and soundness regula-
tion.
Another possible technique for limiting the threat of over-issue is
to restrict those institutions that may issue cybermoney to depository
institutions that already are subject to pervasive governmental
regulation. Indeed, this is the technique recommended by the
American Bankers Association's Payment Systems Task Force."
Such a restriction need not displace the nonbank developers of
cybercash, as they could continue to facilitate the technological
infrastructure of the cybercash systems as partners of the banks.
H. To Use Cybermoney as a Tool to Sustain Macroeconomic Health?
The already-established forms of money or payment that rely on
electronic media (e.g, wire transfers) provide limited means for
central bankers to manipulate either the demand for or the supply of
money. By analogy, the macroeconomic watchdog rationale lends
little justification for regulatory intervention in new forms of
cybermoney. Indeed, the tiny size of the cybermoney market at
present makes the prospect of macroeconomic manipulation through
cybermoney appear quite remote, even if a theory for such interven-
tion were well understood by central bankers.
I. To Streamline and Police Cybermoney Transactions?
Regulations governing the operation of new payment systems
generally have arisen only after commercial practice already has
established a proven, economically efficient prototype. The cyber-
money market, narrowly defined, is far too new and experimental to
withstand regulatory intervention. It seems possible that any
substantial regulatory intervention at this juncture might destroy the
potential viability of any emerging system.
Even after the emergence of a viable and popular cybermoney
system, moreover, it would seem most desirable to permit participants
to set their own standards for its operation, much as occurs in the
self-regulation of the two major credit card networks, Visa and
MasterCard.
The only exception might be to protect consumers whose interests
are not reflected effectively by the self-regulatory organizations. Even
with respect to consumer protection issues, however, it seems
100. See Limit Electronic Banking Products Issuance to Depositoiy Institutions, ABA Report Says, 67
Banking Rep. (BNA) 624, 624 (Oct. 14, 1996) (describing concern expressed in 80-page report
issued on October 6, 1996, that consumers will be harmed if non-bank issuers were to fail).
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appropriate to wait to see if the emerging industry is able to
avoid-whether for competitive commercial reasons, moral reasons,
or both-any natural tendency to take advantage of relatively
disorganized consumers. Government should intervene to protect
consumer interests only after careful evaluation reveals that any final
deal struck with consumers proves in practice to be substantively or
procedurally unfair.
J. To Supervise Lending and Borrowing?
One regulator recently suggested that cybermoney necessarily must
involve an extension of credit, which in turn necessarily must involve
banks. 1 ' One may expand the thought by suggesting that if
cybermoney involves lenders like banks, it also must involve regula-
tion.
It is far from clear that all possible modes of cybermoney will
involve an extension of credit, however. Pre-paid cybermoney
accounts now are being contemplated that would not involve
extensions of credit. Under such circumstances, regulation may not
be warranted.
As a practical matter, however, the regulator may be correct. If
cybermoney is to compete successfully with other modes of payment
that now provide extensions of credit, perhaps cybermoney must find
a way to do so too. And if cybermoney ultimately serves as a means
of extending credit, then the ancient rationale for supervising
relations between lenders and borrowers may be invoked again.
K. To Foster Competition and to Inhibit Private Monopolization?
At this highly preliminary stage, the newest cybermoney prod-
ucts-even those proposed by large firms like Citicorp W 2-- hardly
should raise concerns about untoward consolidations of financial and
monetary power. Nevertheless, the recent troubles experienced by
Microsoft in attempting to purchase Intuit as a means of expanding
into financial services suggests that antitrust and entity-affiliation
concerns will thwart the development of cybermoney as well. 3 As
101. SeeJaret Seiberg, Boston Fed Prsident Sees World as Bankers Do, Extols Their Role, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 23, 1996, at 4. According to Cathy E. Minehan, President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, "It is all well and good to talk about virtual this and virtual that. The reality is
that the payments system is a credit extension, and credit has to involve banks." Id.
102. SeeBloom, supra note 91, at 12 (discussing CitiBank's plan to develop its own electronic
currency for cyberspace).
103. See G. Christian Hill et al., Undone Deal Microsoft Drops Bid for Intuit, WALL ST. J., May
22, 1995, at A1; Seiberg, supra note 101, at 4 (noting concern of Cathy Minehan, President of
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, that "software companies and convenience stores lack the
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a practical matter, however, one must wonder if such concerns will
not hamper the ability of cybermoney systems to develop enough
momentum to become economic. Recalling the massive investment
needed by the Bank of America in the 1960s to release the Visa card,
the antitrust enforcers and bank regulators might well exercise
restraint during the development of cybermoney in the interests of
fostering investment in a promising new monetary technology.
L. To Protect Against Overcompetition in a New Natural Monopoly?
As yet, there is little reason to conclude that new cybermoney
systems are natural monopolies that will fail to attract investment
dollars absent a scheme of regulatory protection. On the contrary,
the nascent appearance of several cybermoney providers in the
Internet market alone suggests that this market is anything but a
natural monopoly. Even if substantial capital resources are necessary
to raise a cybermoney system, like a credit card network, to a critical
level of usage, there is reason to believe that such an enterprise still
may be pursued economically.' In short, the natural monopoly
rationale provides little reason to protect early investors in the
cybermoney field, nor will it likely justify a government takeover of
any successful systems that eventually may emerge.
M. To Tax Citizens and to Fund Government Operations?
Although regulatory bureaucracies may look for new subjects to
regulate tojustify their continued existence in an era of governmental
downsizing, this rationale for regulation is plainly indefensible under
modem conditions. It is doubtful that such a rationale ever will be
admitted publicly by regulators in discussions about the possible
regulation of cybermoney-although such a rationale still may have
some underlying practical force.
N. To Subsidize Particular Groups or Activities?
During his re-election campaign, President Clinton noted that
distributive issues are likely to be associated with Internet develop-
requisite risk controls and management systems to run broader payments programs").
According to Minehan, "Microsoft isn't into the credit business" and "ultimately the credit must
come through the banking system." Id.
104. For example, in 1985, Sears introduced the Discover Card, and more recently Sears has
developed a new credit card with MasterCard. See Antionette Coulton, Sears Testing Cobranded
Product with MasterCard Series, AM. BANKER, Sept. 11, 1996, at 1 (explaining that cobranded
market is highly competitive and that it is hard to "stand-out" among crowd).
1997] 1099
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIny LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1075
ment.' °5  Likewise, distributive issues may be associated with the
development and popularization of cybermoney, if indeed such
development occurs. Access to the Internet, for instance, eventually
may become tantamount to access to profitable monetary vehicles;
isolation from the Interet may doom the citizen to second-class
status. Any such effects simply are too remote from the present to
imagine clearly, however, let alone to regulate.
0. To Protect Existing Regulatory Arrangements and
Overall Financial Soundness?
A few bank regulators already are suggesting that cybermoney
regulation may be coming-even before the market for cybermoney
is measurable. One wonders whether such warnings possibly can be
justified on any ground other than the instinct to regulate all that
might come into contact with banking, and thus, that might threaten
the "safety and soundness" of the sacrosanct financial infrastructure.
If so, such an instinct probably should be left unrealized in the
interests of possible alternative modes of organizing financial affairs.
III. WHEN WARRANTED, How MIGHT GOVERNMENT
REGULATE CYBERMONEY?
In several situations, it appears possible that existing laws already
may regulate cybermoney. For instance, the EFTA °5 and its imple-
menting regulation, Regulation E,' °7 both of which apply to "any
... person who, directly or indirectly, holds an account belonging to
a consumer"' may offer protection to consumers.1" Moreover,
for those forms of cybercash designed to piggyback on the existing
payment system infrastructure, U.C.C. Articles 411° and 4A"' pre-
sumably would apply at least to those parts of the transaction cleared
through the banking system or via wire transfer. Even hackers who
download and use software designed to mimic cybermoney may be
105. See President's Remarks in Macon, Georgia, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2185 (Oct.
25, 1996) (promoting federal program to provide Internet access to every classroom, school, and
library in America by 2000).
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1994).
107. 12 C.F.R. pt. 205 (1996).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(8); 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(I).
109. See Fein, supra note 64, at 8.
110. Article 4 governs bank deposits and collections. See U.C.C. § 4-101 (1995).
111. Article 4Agovernswire transfers, includingwholesale wire transfers. SeeU.C.C. § 4A-102
cmt.
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prosecuted under criminal laws that prohibit the passing of bad
currency 1
2
To the extent that cybermoney may not already fall within the
scope of existing financial laws and regulations, however, lawmakers
and regulators may be challenged to conceptualize new regulatory
regimes. In general, five basic strategies historically have been used
by governments to regulate money, and each is a candidate for the
regulation of cybermoney.
First, pervasive institutional regulation, which already is common in
banking, may be justified when the operation of two or more
independently risky and regulatorily questionable activities are
inherently intertwined, such as deposit-taking and lending. The
development and supervision of a cybermoney system is not so
obviously and necessarily complex; thus pervasive institutional
regulation appears to be among the least attractive regulatory
alternatives.
Second, regulation through government monopolization or market
participation provides another technique to set standards in a
financial setting. The federal government's initial involvement in the
development of the secondary mortgage markets is one example.
Because the cybermoney market itself already is developing on its
own, however, this appears to be another disfavored form of potential
regulation.
Third, transactional regulation, such as the regulation provided by
the EFTA," 3 poses the most promise for regulation of cybermoney.
Because such regulation is predicated on existing patterns of
commerce, however, it appears premature to attempt to develop such
a regulation at this time for fear of reifying the cybermoney business
in a preliminary and inefficient mode."
4
Fourth, limited functional licensing regulation, such as a require-
ment that a firm issuing cybermoney either establish a separate fund
that fully covers the value of any cybermoney outstanding or purchase
cybermoney insurance covering any contingent liability, may be an
appropriate practical method of policing cybermoney firms in this
preliminary stage of market development.15
112. SeeJennifer Kingson Bloom, Eletronic Commerce Seen Ushefing in New World-Of Crime,
AM. BANKER, May 20, 1996, at 14A.
113. 15 U.S.c. §§ 1693-1693r.
114. "Whoever ... being 18 years of age or over, with intent to defraud, makes, utters,
inserts, or uses any card... device... or other thing similar in size and shape to... any coin
or other currency not legal tender in the United States, to procure anything of value... shall
be fined.., or imprisoned .... " 18 U.S.C. § 491(a) (1994).
115. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r.
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Fifth, self regulation is another plausible regulatory arrangement,
although it may require further market development before it
becomes practical in the cybermoney markets.
CONCLUSION
Cybermoney, like other forms of money, justifiably may be
subjected to some regulatory scrutiny, although most of the classic
rationales for the regulation of money do not fit the present
circumstances of the cybermoney market. The two most compelling
rationales for governmental intervention in the cybermoney market
are: (1) to limit the threat of over-issue; and (2) to protect the
integrity of the payment system from systemic failures occasioned by
the default of a large cybermoney issuer. Even these two colorable
rationales, however, would warrant governmental intervention only if
the unregulated portions of the cybermoney markets were substantial-
ly larger than they are today.
Furthermore, when and if that day comes, the threats warranting
regulation may be addressed with minimal intervention by requiring
that the technical issuers of cybermoeny be depository institutions that
already are subject to pervasive institutional regulation, and already
are parties to the payment system. Another regulatory alternative
would be for nonbank issuers of cybermoney to be regulated
narrowly, specifically to address the risks of over-issue and default,
perhaps through the mandatory provision of private issue insurance.
Stated another way, almost all the classic rationales for monetary
regulation fail tojustify governmental intervention in the unregulated
portions of the cybermoney markets.
The initial establishment of a unit of account, of cybermoney's
convertibility to other assets, and of the introduction of a threshold
supply, all are capable of being addressed through the private markets
in coordination with existing monetary regulation.
Would-be issuers of cybermoney already have powerful incentives to
satisfy potential consumers about the safety, reliability and fairness of
cybermoney, so consumer regulation seems premature.
The government's general interest in the macroeconomic and
distributional significance of money is not implicated yet by the
nascent cybermoney products.
Finally, although the possibility of misusing and counterfeiting
cybermoney is palpable and alarming, the government is not in the
best position to design encryption systems and settlement protocols
that would best prevent misuse and fraud. Meanwhile, criminal
1102
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statutes already are on the books that appear to give the government
sufficient power to prosecute any transgressors after the fact.
In short, at least for the foreseeable future, regulatory restraint
seems to be the most reasonable governmental reaction to the
emerging cybermoney payment devices.

